Interest rate regulation, earnings transparency and capital structure: evidence from China by Li, Xiaolong et al.
Interest rate regulation, earnings 
transparency and capital structure: 
evidence from China 
Article 
Accepted Version 
Li, X., Tian, L., Han, L. and Cai, H. (2019) Interest rate 
regulation, earnings transparency and capital structure: 
evidence from China. International Journal of Emerging 
Markets, 15 (5). pp. 923-947. ISSN 1746-8809 doi: 
https://doi.org/10.1108/IJOEM-04-2018-0164 Available at 
http://centaur.reading.ac.uk/87514/ 
It is advisable to refer to the publisher’s version if you intend to cite from the 
work.  See Guidance on citing .
To link to this article DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/IJOEM-04-2018-0164 
Publisher: Emerald 
All outputs in CentAUR are protected by Intellectual Property Rights law, 
including copyright law. Copyright and IPR is retained by the creators or other 
copyright holders. Terms and conditions for use of this material are defined in 
the End User Agreement . 
www.reading.ac.uk/centaur 
CentAUR 
Central Archive at the University of Reading 
Reading’s research outputs online
1 
 
Interest Rate Regulation, Earnings Transparency and Capital Structure: Evidence 
from China 
Abstract 
We use samples from Chinese listed companies to investigate the effects of interest rate 
deregulation and earnings transparency on company’s capital structure in China over the period 
of 2003-2015. In particular, we study the link between state-owned enterprises (SOEs), 
economic growth targets, and marketization in China's unique institutional context. The results 
show earnings transparency increases firm leverage and the additional tests suggest that such 
an effect takes place via a mechanism by reducing the cost of debt finance. However, 
information transparency could moderate the effects of interest rate deregulation on corporate 
capital structure. In addition, SOEs are less sensitive towards the changes of interest rates in 
China because lending to SOEs is policy-oriented and lacks of market evaluation of business 
risk. Government control is conducive to enhancing the transparency of the whole industry, 
however, market-oriented reform is conducive to enhancing the transparency of the company's 
own information. The results are robust to endogeneity tests and a variety of variable and model 
specifications. Lastly, we find that information transparency has little impact on equity 
financing because of IPO and SEO strictly controlled by the Chinese government. The paper 
makes contribution to the relationship between earnings disclosure quality and capital structure 
in the Chinese unique institutional context, such as taking the progressive interest rate reform, 
SOES, different economic growth target and different marketization level in each province of 
China. We suggest that investors will pay more attention to the company's own unique 
information transparency in the provinces with high degree of marketization. As a potential 
direction for future research, we will investigate how the earnings transparency has impact on 
capital structure, and how such impact would depend on  the  transparency of specific business, 
the cap of foreign shareholding and the convenience of investment. 
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1. Introduction 
There has been a long-standing debate among economists regarding the effects of interest rates 
on the real economy (e.g., Bernanke and Gertler, 1995). Following the development of capital 
structure theories (e.g. Modigliani and Miller, 1958), recent studies on the determinants of 
corporate capital structure have shown that the financing decisions would heavily depend on  
financial characteristics and information environment (e.g. Booth et al., 2001; Öztekin, 2015). 
There would be an unfavorable effect of information asymmetries on debt financing (Jensen 
and Meckling, 1976) and firms typically have better information than outsiders about their 
business investment opportunities, causing the problems of information asymmetries and 
agency costs. To some extent, financial reporting and disclosure are potentially important for 
management to communicate corporate performance with external investors. Hence, as a vital 
component of accounting disclosures, earnings transparency can affect the decision-making of 
investors and the corresponding cost of capital (Barth et al, 2013). Goldstein et al (2019) find 
that disclosure negatively affects price in formativeness. To explore further this result, we 
decompose earnings transparency into earnings transparency of industry and the company's 
own earnings transparency. As a result, the earnings transparency would depend on the timing 
and content of firms’ information disclosure. Firms can make timely and informative 
disclosures are perceived to have a lower likelihood of withholding value-relevant unfavorable 
information, firms would pay lower prices on debt finance and have a greater tendency to 
leverage up. 
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Different from developed economies, China, as the largest emerging economy, has been 
experiencing a monetary regime that featured a regulated currency, a controlled capital account 
and a regulated domestic interest rate by central bank (Zhang et al., 2014) and so far pursued a 
financial liberalization strategy. Indeed, China has been gradually reforming its financial sector 
from early 1980s and the monetary policy environment has undergone a significant change. 
Especially, the pace of interest rate liberalization reforms have accelerated since 1996 by 
making the exchange rates more flexible and market-oriented, expanding the interbank money, 
bond, and stock markets, opening the banking sector to more competition and liberalizing 
interest rates. Chen and Li (2015) note that the reforms, that provide a distinct institutional 
environment and financing conditions, have changed the environment of business significantly. 
Along this line, Chen and Ma (2018) uses liberalization of the ceiling on deposit rates and floor 
on lending rates to test the impact of interest rate liberalization on loan availability. Zheng et 
al. (2018) uses the official launch of the Loan Prime Rate (LPR) Centralized Quotation and 
Publishing Mechanism, in order to test whether the interest rate liberalization affected the 
deleveraging of over-indebted firms. Zhao et al. (2019) suggest that the interest rate 
marketization, which reduced government intervention in fund pricing, helps alleviate 
financing constraints, especially for non-state-owned enterprises. These studies are helpful for 
understanding the effect of marketization of interest rates on debt financing. 
Building upon the above studies, we can expect that after reforms, risk premium on loans 
should reflect more business risk-relevant information and there should be a stronger favorable 
effect of information transparency on capital structure (Francis et al., 2004). High quality 
earnings disclosures are required by lenders to capture changes in firm performance, which 
potentially enable firms to acquire more debt financing supports. However, they ignore the 
essential features of market-oriented reforms. Filling this gap, we use interest rate regulation 
to test the underlying mechanisms. Focusing on the interest rate liberalization reforms in China, 
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we explore the relationship between earnings disclosure quality and debt financing behaviors 
of Chinese publicly listed companies. Besides, we shed new light on the interactions between 
earnings transparency and interest rate deregulation in the context of state owned firm, different 
economic growth target and different marketization level in each province of China. 
In particular, we follow Barth et al. (2013) and construct an index of earnings transparency 
of Chinese listed companies from both intertemporal and cross-sectional perspectives. We find 
strong evidence that the more transparent the information, the more debt financing. However, 
informationally transparent firms would moderate the effects of interest rate deregulation on 
corporate capital structure. These findings are in consistent with those of Botosan (1997) who 
uses data from developed markets. In addition, we find that state-owned enterprises (SOEs) are 
less sensitive towards the changes of interest rates in China because lending to SOEs is policy-
oriented and lacks of market evaluation of business risk. We find that information transparency 
has little impact on equity financing because of IPO and SEO strictly controlled by the Chinese 
government. We suggest that economic growth target under the condition of deregulating 
interest rate the government's economic regulation is beneficial to the industry as a whole, 
however, it is not beneficial for individual enterprises. Furthermore, we suggest that investors 
will pay more attention to the company's own unique information transparency in the provinces 
with high degree of marketization. Finally, government control is conducive to enhancing the 
transparency of the industry, however, market-oriented reform is conducive to enhancing the 
transparency of the company's own information. 
In a word, our research will help to understand the debt financing in the context of interest 
rate deregulation and find which is crucial to identify the real effects of the new economic 
regimes in China. In particular terms, we make contribution to the previous research from four 
aspects. Firstly, we decompose earnings transparency into earnings transparency of industry 
and the company's own earnings transparency. We also consider the interactive effects of 
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information transparency and gradual interest rate liberalization on debt financing. Secondly, 
we suggest that that SOEs have an advantage over private firms in accessing debt finance with 
interest rate deregulation. Thirdly, we suggest that economic growth target is conducive to 
enhancing the transparency at the industry level, but not the firm’s own transparency. Fourthly, 
we suggest that marketization in each province of China is conducive to enhancing firm’s own 
transparency, bu not the transparency of the industry. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we introduce the 
institutional background of interest rate regulation in China. We review literature and develop 
hypotheses in Section 3, and define the key variables and data in Section 4. We present our 
econometric results in Section 5 and conclusion in Section 6. 
 
2. The institutional background of interest rate regulation 
The ‘supply-side’ effect of credit market (De Janvry et al., 2010) on corporate leverage has 
attracted an increasing attention in academia, such as the market timing hypothesis (Baker and 
Wurgler, 2002) which claims that market timing is the first order determinant of capital 
structure. Therefore, corporate characteristics and capital market play a fundamental role in the 
determination of corporate capital structure and investment, such as information transparency 
and investment distortions (e.g. Wang et al., 2011).  
However, capital market is not perfect in the emerging economies and in credit supply is 
mainly embodied in the high level of regulation,  for example interest rate regulation in China. 
The interest rate control has been one of the most typical macro-regulatory functions used by 
government to regulate the supply of financial products (Huang and Wang, 2010), which have 
a significant impact on corporate financing and investment behavior. Currently, Chinese 
government has pledged to steadily put forward with the interest rate reform, and the particular 
institutional characteristics of the control are mainly reflected in two aspects.  
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First, as the central bank in China, People's Bank of China (PBoC), is actively controlling 
the interest rates in accordance with the macro-economic conditions. Chinese government has 
adjusted interest rates significantly in the last decade in order to achieve a balance between 
maintaining relatively rapid and stable economic development and properly handling 
inflationary pressures. For example, the loan interest rate ceiling was released in 2004. 
However, the central bank lifted the one-year lending and deposit base rates six times to cope 
with excessive liquidity and inflationary pressures, while initiated a slew of interest rate 
reductions since September 2009 to deal with the international financial crisis in 2007. On 7th 
June 2012, the upper limit of the floating range of deposit rate in financial institutions was set 
at the 1.1 times of the base rate, the lower limit of loan rate was set at the 0.8 times, which is a 
breakthrough in the interest rate liberalization progress because it hands the capital pricing 
power over to the market to a greater extent. Lately, with the eliminating of the floor on lending 
rate on 19th July 2013, the liberalization of interest rates was fully implemented. 
As shown in Figure 1, for example, Chinese government adjusted the lending rate (deposit 
interest rate) 1 (1) times in 2004 and 2014, 2 (1) times in 2006, 6 (6) times in 2007, 5 (4) times 
in 2008, 2 (2) times in 2010 and 2012, 3 (3) times in 2011 and 5 (5) times in 2015. In some 
other years, such as 2003, 2005, 2009 and 2013, there were no interest rate adjustment in China. 
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Figure 1 Number of adjustment of benchmark one-year lending and deposit rates 
 
Second, China has been moving into a more market-oriented financial system by making 
substantial progress in liberalizing financial markets, and its interest rates in particular, show a 
distinct two-track system which is composed of a regulated rate and a market rate (Zhang, 
2014). With the promulgation of interbank rate deregulation on 1st June 1996, the reform of 
interest rate liberalization started to implement across the whole country. For example, markets 
started to open for transactions on financial and government bonds since 1998, foreign currency 
loan interest rates were deregulated in 2000, and the ceiling on lending rates were removed, 
allowing borrowing costs to vary up to a range of 10 percent lower than the base rate in 2004. 
Subsequently, on 4th January 2007, the Shanghai Interbank Offered Rate (SHIBOR) rates was 
officially launched. With financial market reform, interest rate liberalization is essentially a 
deregulating process that continually improves market forces and strengthens competition in 
banking sector. It not only builds a market-based capital allocation system outside the interest 
rate control, but also enables commercial banks to make loan pricing decision by themselves. 
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Figure 2 shows the fluctuation of both lending and deposit rates during the liberalization 
process, and presents a certain degree of difference between regulated base rate and market-
based SHIBOR rates. There have been a large number of studies examining the effectiveness 
of interest rate liberalization in China, for example, the link between deregulation and economy 
growth (Chen et al., 2014). This paper therefore aims to complement the literature by focusing 
on the effect of earnings transparency to explore how the action of interest rate deregulation 
would affect corporate financing behavior. 
Figure 2 Fluctuation of interest rates during the liberalization  process 
 
 
3. Literature review and hypotheses development 
3.1 Earnings transparency and debt financing  
The modern theory of capital structure began with the capital structure theories (Modigliani 
and Miller, 1958) and has been further developed by subsequent contributions, such as trade-
off theory and pecking order theory.  Apart from the heterogeneity of firm level characteristics 
(Booth et al., 2001), the degree of market development has also been found to have a strong 
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impact on the homogeneity of corporate behavior in developed markets (Rajan and Zingales, 
1995), while firms in developing countries are distinctive to each other. Furthermore, market 
imperfections, such as asymmetric information problem, cause capital rationing (Stiglitz and 
Weiss, 1981) and the information environment of firms, is heterogeneous and has a strong 
impact on the access to funding sources (Booth et al., 2001).  
The importance of transparent financial disclosures lies in its role in reducing the cost of 
external finance and in easing financial constraints. Corporate financing choices are affected 
by information issues between the insiders and outside investors (e.g. Jensen and Meckling, 
1976), and information asymmetry is positively associated with the cost of capital (e.g. 
Lambert et al., 2007). Goldstein et al (2019) find that in markets that are effective in 
aggregating private information, disclosure negatively affects price informativeness. 
Therefore, on one hand, informationally opaque borrowers usually face higher cost of external 
finance. One the other hand, transparency and disclosure policies can shape a firm’s 
information environment in the presence of agency conflicts. A high quality accounting 
reporting has a decisive bearing on financing through improving the contracting process, 
enhancing the level of monitoring and mitigating the misevaluation problems of both managers 
and financial analysts (Zhang and Lu, 2007).  
Banks lenders are not only concerned with the interests they receive on the loan, but also 
with the riskiness of the loan issued (Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981) and therefore, they require a 
high quality accounting reporting to assess the information about credit worthiness and 
profitability of borrowers. Meanwhile, firms, consistently making timely and informative 
disclosures, are perceived to have a lower likelihood of withholding adverse information in the 
assessment of banks, and will consequently be charged a lower risk premium in debt finance 
(Francis et al., 2004). Bova et al. (2018) find that when the SOE’s social concerns are 
sufficiently important and when the market competitiveness is sufficiently low, the SOE 
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commits to fully disclosing its private information. Otherwise, the SOE commits to 
withholding its private information. Therefore, firms with high earnings disclosure quality 
would enjoy a lower effective interest cost on loans. Moreover, borrowing is typically a 
repeated game, earnings transparency from the high quality accounting system can serve as an 
implicit contract and an input in the explicit contract between the firms and banks, which 
thereby restricting managers from incurring agency costs in the contractual mechanisms. 
Therefore, we hypothesize  
H1: Earnings transparency of firms is positively associated with the level of debt finance. 
Even though, H1 does not exclude the possibility that the cost of equity capital may also 
decrease due to the improvement of earnings transparency (Botosan, 1997). This is because, 
according to the optimal capital structure argument (e.g. Qian et al., 2009), publicly listed 
companies are inclined to adjust debt ratio towards an equilibrium level to minimize cost of 
capital and to maximize firm value. However, we consider this concern to be relatively less 
salient to our hypothesis on debt finance for three reasons. First, in a government-dominated 
financial system in China (Fan et al., 2008), public firms rely more heavily on bank loans than 
on equity finance (Firth et al., 2009), where equity finance is strictly regulated by government, 
earnings transparency plays a more important role in accessing bank loan than equity finance 
(Tian et al., 2015). Second, compared with equity holders, lenders face more severe 
information asymmetries. Third, we call for an empirical investigation on the effects of 
earnings transparency on leverage which would be helpful to fully understand whether the 
effect is more significant for loans or for equity finance. Finally, we hypothesize a linear effect 
of earnings transparency on debt finance for Chinese companies to reflect their low level of 
earnings transparency (Joseph and Wong, 2012) and limited access to debt finance (Huang and 
Song, 2006), especially for those small and private firms. This is important as it implies that 
the benefits of improving transparency are still greater than the costs and businesses have 
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incentives to improve transparency and to obtain more debt finance. This does not, however, 
exclude the possibility of non-linear effects (inverted U) where the costs of improving 
transparency become greater than the benefits of doing so1.  
3.2 Interest rate deregulation, earnings transparency and debt financing 
Capital structure theories assume that the availability of incremental capital is determined by 
the characteristics of the firm and credit rationing may exist because of information 
asymmetries (Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981). The value of a company’s debt will change as the 
external environment changes (Acharya and Gale, 2011). Therefore, according to the market 
timing hypothesis (Baker and Wurgler, 2002), supply side effect is important in determining 
capital structure and supporting evidence is available from surveys of corporate managers 
(Brau and Fawcett, 2006) and large sample studies (Alti, 2006).  
In the process of market-oriented reform of interest rate, liberalization facilitates the progress 
of deregulation by central government or central bank and moving towards a market-oriented 
and competition-driven mechanism. Therefore, interest rate liberalization is an important way 
to diversify financial products where financial institutions have a wider scope to price their 
financial products (Feyzioğlu et al., 2009). In contrast, a rigid regulation of interest rates 
constrains market competition and discourages banks from serving informationally opaque and 
highly risky firms (e.g. Gelos and Werner, 2002) because of inflexibility to charge an 
appropriate rate. The removal of administrative control on interest rates enables commercial 
banks to customize their financial products and prices to fully reflect the risk-relevant 
information of the borrowers in a competition-driven and market oriented way. For example, 
after loan rate ceiling is removed, risker borrowers would be able to obtain more debt finance 
with risk-adjusted loan prices (Chen and Ma, 2018).  Therefore, credit supply increases and 
                                                          
1 In an additional test, we include squared earnings transparency and find the existence of such non-linear effects.  
The results are not reported but available from the authors on request. 
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businesses have better accesses to debt finance. To price correctly on risk, banks depend 
heavily on information transparency and the costs of collecting information. More flexible 
interest rates should reflect the reductions in information acquisition costs of commercial banks. 
The rapid development of information technology has changed the costs of the financing 
businesses, and banks' pricing on deposits and lending is required to be in line with the 
changing costs. Relaxing current interest rate regulations in China enables banks to charge a 
market-determined risk premium on loans, which is consistent with the risk profile of their 
borrowers (Xu, 2007). Therefore, we hypothesize  
H2: Interest rate deregulation would strengthen the expected favorable impacts of earnings 
transparency on debt financing. 
4. Data and Methodology  
4.1 Data Collection 
We collect empirical data from two sources. All firm-level financial data and market data are 
obtained from the China Stock Market and Accounting Research Database (CSMAR), and the 
data of corporate ownership structure are collected from China Centre for Economic Research 
Database (CCER) which is developed by SinoFin Information Technology Company and 
Peking University. We exclude sample firms in finance industry and those with missing data. 
Based on Barth et al. (2013), we drop the samples with less than 10 observations a year in each 
industry and we winsorize variables at a 99% level to reduce the outlier effects.  
Our empirical data cover the time period between 2003 and 2015 for two reasons. First, this 
is the period when Chinese government has started to put forward with interest rate reform. 
The PBoC was active in controlling the interest rates in accordance with the macro-economic 
conditions during this period and market interest rates, in particular, show a distinct two-track 
system which is composed of a regulated state rate and a market rate (Zhang et al., 2014). 
Second, our variable construction requires to trace back data for 5 years (see the next section 
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for more details) and to make the empirical results more comparable, we restrict our samples 
to this period to minimize the effects of missing values. Hence, 13,793 firm-year observations 
during the period of 2003-2015 are used in the following empirical analysis. 
4.2 Dependent variables: Debt financing 
Based on Rajan and Zingales (1995), we use total debt ratio to measure the debt financing, Lev, 
which is defined as the ratio of the book value of the firm i's total liabilities to total assets.   
4.3 Independent variables 
4.3.1 Earnings transparency measure (Trans) 
Following Barth et al. (2013), we measure earnings transparency by the explanatory power of 
the returns-earnings relation to capture the extent to which earnings and change in earnings, 
and information correlated with these changes. This is because “regardless of the source of 
variation in earnings transparency, higher (lower) transparency will result in higher (lower) 
explanatory power in the returns-earnings relation” (Barth et al., 2013, p.209). Specifically, 
Trans is constructed by using adjusted R2s from a two-step estimation procedure to permit both 
intertemporal and cross-sectional variation. The estimations of adjusted R2s are established 
based on the relation between earnings and changes in earnings deflated by price, and 
contemporaneous annual stock returns.  
The first R2 is calculated as annual returns-earnings relations estimated over industry 
according to the industry-year regression Eq. (1),  
𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1 ∗
𝐸𝑖,𝑗,𝑡
𝑃𝑖,𝑗,𝑡−1
+ 𝛼2 ∗
△𝐸𝑖,𝑗,𝑡
𝑃𝑖,𝑗,𝑡−1
+ 𝜀𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 …………………….. (1) 
 
Where 𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 is the annual return measured as beginning four months after the firm i’s fiscal 
year t ends in the industry j. 𝐸𝑖,𝑗,𝑡  represents the annual earnings per share, and 𝑃𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 is the 
opening share price of the year. △ 𝐸𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 is the change in earnings from year t-1 to year t. The 
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coefficients in the model, 𝛼0, 𝛼1 and  𝛼2, are assumed to be the same for all firms within the 
same industry j in year t. We estimate this model for 21 industries during 13 years (t = 2003, …, 
2015), and generate separate industry components as 𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑗,𝑡. 
In order to fully capture the differences across firms in the returns-earnings relation, we place 
observations from Eq. (1) into one of four portfolios p (p=1, …,4) based on the magnitude of 
their associated residuals 𝜀𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 from each annual regression for that industry. For example, the 
first portfolio is comprised of the quartile of observations from each annual industry regression 
with the most negative residuals. Then, we calculate the second R2 to construct Trans from the 
portfolio-year regression Eq. (2) which permits the industry-neutral component of earnings 
transparency to vary over time. This estimation procedure does not constrain the coefficients 
in Eq. (2) and 𝛽0, 𝛽1 and 𝛽2 are to be the same for firms within industry j in year t. Rather, it 
constrains firms within portfolio p to have the same coefficients in year t. Finally, we obtain 
52 industry-neutral components (13 years and 4 portfolios) as 𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑝,𝑡. 
𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑖,𝑝,𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 ∗
𝐸𝑖,𝑝,𝑡
𝑃𝑖,𝑝,𝑡−1
+ 𝛽2 ∗
△𝐸𝑖,𝑝,𝑡
𝑃𝑖,𝑝,𝑡−1
+ 𝜀𝑖,𝑝,𝑡   ……………………(2) 
 
Therefore, we obtain our earnings transparency for firm i in year t by summing the R2s 
pertaining to firm i’s industry and industry-neutral returns-earnings regressions in year t, i.e. 
𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑗,𝑡 and 𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑝,𝑡, where j and p denote industry and portfolio, respectively. 
𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑗,𝑡 + 𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑝,𝑡 ………………………….(3) 
 
4.3.2 Interest rate deregulation (IRdereg) 
Following existing literature on the relation between institutional environment and economic 
behavior (e.g. Wang et al., 2011), we use a dummy variable to capture interest rate deregulation 
(IRdereg) which is equal to one if the sample observation is in the year of 2004, 2012 and 2013 
15 
 
when the interest rate market-oriented reforms were pushed forward actively by government, 
and zero otherwise. For example, low interest rate ceiling was released in 2004 and the lower 
limit of interest rate was implemented in 2015 where market started to play a more important 
role than government in interest rate determination and capital allocation. 
In a robustness test, we also use a continuous variable IRdereg2 to measure the degree of 
interest rate deregulation. IRdereg2 is defined as the difference between market SHIBOR rate 
and government-controlled benchmark one-year lending rate. The greater the value of the 
difference, the greater the interest rate liberalization is to be. We expect that in the process of 
interest rate reforms, firms would have better access to debt finance, and the effect of earnings 
transparency on the debt financing would be more significant.  
4.4 Other control variables 
We follow Huang and Song (2006) to consider firm-level control variables, such as firm size, 
Tobin’s Q, ownership etc. The detailed definitions and their expected effects on debt finance 
are provided in Table 1. 
Table 1 Control Variables Definitions 
Variable Definition Expectation 
ROA Profitability = Net income/annual 
average total assets 
The effect is uncertain. On one hand, the higher the 
profitability, the easier for a firm to obtain loans. On 
the other, it may also have a stronger incentives to 
use internal finance with the existence of 
information asymmetries.  
Size Firm size =  Natural logarithm of book 
value of total assets 
Firm size is positively related to the ability of a firm 
to raise debt. 
Tq Tobin’s Q = (Current  stock market value 
+ net assets value of per  non-tradable 
shares multiplied by the number of non-
tradable shares + total liabilities)/ book 
value of total asset  
The effect is uncertain. On one hand, the greater the 
growth potential, the more loans needed to finance 
growth. On the other, with little growth potential, 
firms may rely more on external finance because of 
the diminished cash flow.   
First Ownership structure =  The proportion of 
the firm’s largest shareholding  
The higher non-tradable shares, the easier it is for the 
firm to access bank loans. 
Liquid liquidity = (Cash and cash equivalents +  
short-term assets)/book value of total 
asset 
The more liquid the firm's assets are, the easier to get 
a loan. 
 
Fixas 
Tangibility =  The ratio of net fixed 
assets to total assets 
Tangibility is positively related to the ability to raise 
debt finance. 
ETR Effective tax rate =  Income tax expenses 
divided by EBIT 
Tax rate is negatively related to long term debt (Kane 
et al., 1985). Firms subject to higher tax rate are 
inclined to use short term debts.  
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4.5 Summary Statistics 
Table 2 presents the descriptive statistics for the variables used in the following estimations. In 
terms of earnings transparency (Trans), China’s listed firms averagely have a lower earnings 
transparency than their US counterparts (Barth et al., 2013). In particular, the mean and median 
of earnings transparency (Trans) are 0.204 and 0.169 respectively, while the mean and median 
of the earnings transparency in industries is 0.065 and 0.035. It shows that, the mean and 
median of total debt ratio (Lev) is 0.510 and 0.510 in China, which is in consistent with Shen 
et al. (2009). 
Table 2 Descriptive statistics 
Variable Obs Mean Median Std. dev. Min Max 
Trans 13793 0.204 0.169 0.152 -0.014 0.734 
Transi 13793 0.065 0.035 0.100 -0.05 0.618 
Transin 13793 0.140 0.109 0.106 0.007 0.374 
Lev 13793 0.510 0.510 0.238 0.059 1.533 
IRdereg 13793 0.307 0.000 0.461 0.000 1.000 
ROA 13793 0.031 0.033 0.078 -0.324 0.232 
Size 13793 21.722 21.602 1.247 18.868 25.400 
Tq 13793 2.316 1.925 1.274 0.954 9.259 
First 13793 36.282 34.110 15.495 8.810 75.000 
Liquid 13793 0.169 0.136 0.126 0.005 0.617 
Fixas 13793 0.269 0.236 0.183 0.002 0.763 
ETR 13793 0.189 0.166 0.156 0.000 0.857 
State 13793 0.534 1.000 0.499 0.000 1.000 
The table reports summary statistics for all samples used in this study, including dependent, independent and 
control variables between 2003 and 2015. 
 
In addition, to investigate the bias that comes from high correlation among 
independent variables in the regression, Table 3 reports the continuous correlations (lower 
section) and partial correlations (upper section) of each variable and shows that the debt 
financing behavior is positive correlated with earnings transparency and with interest rate 
deregulation, consistent with H1 and H2. 
 
 
Industry 
Industry dummy variables which are 
classified according to the CSRC (China 
Securities Regulatory Commission) 
classification standard issued in 1998 
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Table 3 Correlation matrix of key variables 
 
 Trans Lev IRdereg ROA Size Tq First Liquid Fixas Etr State 
Trans 1.00 0.03*** -0.11*** -0.01 0.02** -0.19*** 0.05*** -0.03*** 0.01 0.05*** 0.13*** 
Lev 0.03** 1.00 0.13*** -0.39*** 0.24*** 0.13*** 0.00 -0.35*** 0.03*** 0.02 0.15*** 
IRdereg 0.12*** 0.14*** 1.00 -0.01 -0.12*** 0.12*** 0.01 -0.10*** 0.12*** -0.01 0.30*** 
ROA -0.01 -0.52*** 0.04*** 1.00 0.20*** 0.01 0.15*** 0.29*** -0.12*** 0.24*** -0.05*** 
Size 0.02** 0.01 0.13*** 0.27*** 1.00 -0.33*** 0.27*** -0.04*** 0.03*** 0.20*** 0.23*** 
Tq -0.14*** 0.33*** -0.08*** -0.22*** -0.42*** 1.00 -0.22*** 0.03** -0.09*** -0.15*** -0.10*** 
First 0.05*** -0.05*** -0.01 0.16*** 0.30*** -0.20*** 1.00 -0.01 0.06*** 0.08*** 0.23*** 
Liquid -0.03*** -0.32*** 0.11*** 0.23*** -0.09*** 0.07*** -0.02* 1.00 -0.35*** 0.06*** -0.10*** 
Fixas -0.00 0.05*** -0.12*** -0.10*** 0.07*** -0.09*** 0.06*** -0.36*** 1.00 -0.06*** 0.18*** 
ETR 0.04*** -0.04*** 0.01 0.19*** 0.13*** -0.15*** 0.04*** -0.00 -0.04*** 1.00 0.05*** 
State 0.11*** 0.06*** -0.30*** -0.01 0.23*** -0.12*** 0.22*** -0.12*** 0.19*** 0.04*** 1.00 
                   The table reports the continuous correlations (lower section) and partial correlations (upper section) of each variable. *, ** and *** denote  
            statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level for which the null hypothesis is rejected.   
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5. Results and Discussion  
5.1 Baseline specifications 
5.1.1 The effect of earnings transparency 
The main objective of this paper is to investigate the impacts of earnings transparency on 
corporate debt finance by controlling for the interaction with interest rate regulation. We start 
with the model Eq. (4) to examine the relationship between earnings transparency and firms’ 
leverage decisions to test H1.  
𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑇𝑞𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑠𝑡𝑖,𝑡 +
                                            𝛽6𝐿𝑖𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑑𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽7𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑎𝑠𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽8𝐸𝑇𝑅𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡…………….. (4) 
Next, Eq. (5) is designed to test H2 by adding the variable interest rate deregulation 
(𝐼𝑅𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑔𝑖,𝑡) and earning transparency (𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑖,𝑡), as well as the interaction between them. As 
the variable 𝐼𝑅𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑔𝑖,𝑡 is measured as a dummy variable, we exclude the year dummies in our 
baseline and subsequent specifications. 
𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐼𝑅𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑔𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐼𝑅𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑔𝑖,𝑡 ∗ 𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑖,𝑡 +
                                           𝛽4𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽5𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽6𝑇𝑞𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽7𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑠𝑡𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽8𝐿𝑖𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑑𝑖,𝑡 +
                                           𝛽9𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑎𝑠𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽10𝐸𝑇𝑅𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 ……………………… (5) 
We follow Petersen (2009) and employ the cluster analysis at a firm level with the control 
of industry. Tables 4 and 5 show the baseline results of Eq. (4) and (5) respectively. Table 4 
shows that total debt ratio (Lev) increases over earnings transparency (Trans, Transi and 
Transin) at a 1% significance level, supporting H1 that the degree of earnings transparency of 
Chinese listed firms is positively related with their debt financing behavior. We also investigate 
the possible multicollinearity problem by Variance Inflation Factors (VIF). Our results show 
little evidence of such a problem with all VIF less than 10 and an average of 1.78. Besides, the 
constant terms are significant in most specifications. This result indicates that the enterprise 
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itself will have a expect target debt ratio.  We also find the goal of capital structure, which is 
the logic starting point of studying the capital structure, to be significant.  
Table 4. The effect of earnings transparency on corporate debt financing 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Lev Lev Lev 
Constant -0.859*** -0.850*** -0.850*** 
 (-13.50) (-13.42) (-13.38) 
Trans 0.051***   
 (6.20)   
Transi  0.070***  
  (6.01)  
Transin   0.044*** 
   (3.70) 
ROA -1.424*** -1.426*** -1.425*** 
 (-28.92) (-28.92) (-28.87) 
Size 0.063*** 0.063*** 0.063*** 
 (23.45) (23.45) (23.37) 
First 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.66) (0.70) (0.68) 
Tq 0.047*** 0.047*** 0.047*** 
 (11.42) (11.40) (11.34) 
Liquid -0.438*** -0.437*** -0.438*** 
 (-15.27) (-15.26) (-15.27) 
Fixas -0.035 -0.036 -0.035 
 (-1.53) (-1.54) (-1.52) 
ETR 0.078*** 0.079*** 0.078*** 
 (5.29) (5.38) (5.26) 
Year dummies Control Control Control 
Industry dummies Control Control Control 
Observations 13793 13793 13793 
Adjusted R-squared 0.449 0.448 0.448 
         Note1: The table presents regression coefficients and t-statistics (in parentheses) for Eq. (4), by using a        
cluster analysis at firm level for all samples with a full set of controls.  The dependent variables are the 
total debt ratio. All VIFs are lower than 10. 
          Note 2:  *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level for which the null hypothesis   
is rejected. 
 
5.1.2 Interest rate deregulation, earnings transparency and corporate debt financing 
Furthermore, Table 5 shows that interest rate deregulation (IRdereg) is significantly and 
negatively related to the total debt ratio (Lev) at a 1% level. This result implies that the action 
of the interest rate deregulation brings more uncertainty of financing so that firms may reduce 
debt financing in the same year. The results are consistent with Li et al. (2018) and Wang et al. 
(2018). The estimate of interaction term (IRdereg*Trans) is positive and indicates that the 
effect of earnings transparency on firms’ leverage increases along with a process of constant 
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deregulation on interest rate, supporting H2, where with the improvement of earnings 
transparency, firms use more debt finance compared with equity finance.  
Table 5. Interest rate deregulation, earnings transparency and corporate debt financing 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Lev Lev Lev 
Constant -0.893*** -0.894*** -0.886*** 
 (-14.02) (-14.10) (-13.93) 
IRdereg -0.075*** -0.071*** -0.076*** 
 (-14.80) (-16.52) (-14.78) 
Trans 0.011   
 (1.07)   
Transi  0.029**  
  (2.38)  
Transin   -0.013 
   (-0.80) 
IRdereg *Trans 0.059***   
 (3.63)   
IRdereg *Transi  0.120***  
  (2.61)  
IRdereg *Transin   0.081*** 
   (3.72) 
Control variables Yes Yes Yes 
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 13793 13793 13793 
Adjusted R-squared 0.464 0.464 0.464 
 Note 1: The table presents regression coefficients and t-statistics (in parentheses) for Eq. (5), by using a cluster 
analysis at the firm level for all samples with full set of controls. The dependent variables are the total 
debt ratio. We exclude the year dummies because the variable IRdereg is measured as a year dummy 
variable. 
Note 2: All VIFs are lower than 10. *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level for 
which the null hypothesis is rejected. Results for control variables are not reported but available upon 
request from the authors. 
 
 
5.2 Mechanisms 
5.2.1 Earnings transparency and cost of debt financing 
Our early results suggest that earnings transparency increases corporate leverage and in this 
section, we follow Barth at al. (2013) to examine the mechanism from the costing perspective 
where earnings transparency reduces cost of debt finance and then motivates companies to raise 
more debt. To capture the impacts of interest rate deregulation on capital structure, we use 
regulated interest as dependent variables to measure the difference between market SHIBOR 
rates and the actual interest rates of samples.  
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We apply a cluster analysis at firm level for all samples with a full set of control variables 
and report the results in Table 6. It shows that the effects of earnings transparency on the cost 
of debt finance is negative and statistically significant at a 1% level. Therefore, our empirical 
results support the conjecture that earnings transparency improves leverage by reducing the 
cost of debt finance.  
Table 6. Earnings transparency and the cost of debt financing 
  (1) (2) (3) 
  Cost of debt finance  Cost of debt finance Cost of debt finance 
Constant -4.738 -5.932* -4.007 
 (-1.43) (-1.75) (-1.20) 
Trans -3.352***   
 (-4.22)   
Transi  -1.629*  
  (-1.76)  
Transin   -4.534*** 
   (-3.99) 
Control variables Yes  Yes 
Industry dummies Yes  Yes 
Year dummies Yes   Yes 
Observations 651 651 651 
Adjusted R-squared 0.46 0.441 0.461 
 Note 1:  The table presents regression coefficients and t-statistics (in parentheses) for tests of earnings 
transparency and the cost of debt financing by using a cluster analysis at the firm level for all 
samples with full set of controls. The dependent variables are Regulated Interest, which is 
calculated by the difference between market SHIBOR rates and the actual ratio of the business 
loan of firms from commercial bank.  
Note 2: All VIFs are lower than 10. *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level 
for which the null hypothesis is rejected. Results for control variables are not reported but 
available upon request from the authors. 
5.2.2 Earnings transparency, interest rate deregulation and cost of debt financing 
We explicitly consider the impacts of interest rate deregulation by IRdereg and its interaction 
terms with earnings transparency measures.  Similar to earlier results, interest rate deregulation 
reduces leverage by increasing cost of debt, just as in table 7. The coefficients of interaction 
terms, however, are statistically negative, support H2, where interest rate deregulation 
enhances the favorable effects of earnings transparency on corporate debt financing by 
reducing the costs of debt. 
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Table 7. Earnings transparency, interest rate deregulation and cost of debt finance 
  (1) (2) (3) 
  Cost of debt finance Cost of debt finance Cost of debt finance 
Constant -7.573** -7.946** -8.396** 
 (-2.16) (-2.21) (-2.44) 
IRdereg 1.554*** 0.255 2.299*** 
 -3.71 -0.7 -6.17 
Trans 0.671   
 (0.71)   
Transi  -1.354  
  (-1.26)  
Transin   7.890*** 
   (4.94) 
IRdereg *Trans -5.617***   
 (-3.71)   
IRdereg *Transi  4.352  
  (1.11)  
IRdereg *Transin   -13.442*** 
   (-6.84) 
Control variables Yes  Yes 
Industry dummies Yes  Yes 
Year dummies Yes   Yes 
Observations 651 651 651 
Adjusted R-squared 0.385 0.361 0.418 
 Note 1: The table presents regression coefficients and t-statistics (in parentheses) for tests of earnings 
transparency, interest rate deregulation and the cost of debt financing by using a cluster analysis at the 
firm level for all samples with full set of controls. The dependent variables is regulated Interest, which 
is calculated by the difference between market SHIBOR rates and the actual ratio of the business loan of 
firms from commercial bank.   
Note 2: All VIFs are lower than 10. *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level for 
which the null hypothesis is rejected. Results for control variables are not reported but available upon 
request from the authors. 
 
5.3 The impact of corporate ownership in China 
Existing capital structure literature has highlighted the effects of ownership structure on 
corporate capital structure decisions (e.g. Berger et al., 1997) and shown that state-owned 
enterprises (SOEs) in China have easier access to credit and gain political advantages than 
private firms (Brandt and Li, 2003). Firth et al. (2009) also suggest that having the state as a 
minority owner would help private firms obtain bank loans easily, especially for firms located 
in a less developed banking sector. The economic transition that China is experiencing is 
characterized by the transformation of the financial system from a relation and bank-dominated 
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system, to an arm's-length security market dominated system. Therefore, it is important to 
investigate corporate capital structure under this scenario within a regulated banking market in 
China.   
This interest-sharing relationship between SOEs and state-owned banks encourages Chinese 
banking system to stipulate preference loan rates and lend primarily to SOEs with little regard 
for commercial motives (Liu et al. 2011), known as ‘ownership discrimination’ in banking 
finance. Secondly, government usually supports SOEs that are in financial distress through 
direct investment, loans, or reduced taxes, and also writes off prior loans or changes the terms 
of prior loans because of the political objectives such as employment goals. These ‘soft budget 
constraints’ are commonly seen in transition and socialist economies (Frydman et al., 1999). 
As SOEs, local governments and their investment vehicles remain as large borrowers in 
Chinese credit markets, and therefore, it is reasonable to expect that they tend to be less 
sensitive and less responsive to market interest rates, partially marginalizing the potential 
benefits of allocating capital more efficiently via market-based interest rates. Hence, we 
examine the effect of state ownership on corporate leverage by interacting earnings 
transparency and interest rate control as: 
𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐼𝑅𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑔𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖,𝑡 ∗ 𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐼𝑅𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑔𝑖,𝑡 ∗
𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽6𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖,𝑡 ∗ 𝐼𝑅𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑔𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽7𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖,𝑡 ∗ 𝐼𝑅𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑔𝑖,𝑡 ∗ 𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽8𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡 +  𝛽9𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑡 +
𝛽10𝑇𝑞𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽11𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑠𝑡𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽12𝐿𝑖𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑑𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽13𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑎𝑠𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽14𝐸𝑇𝑅𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 …………………….. (6) 
Where 𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖,𝑡 is a dummy variable indicating the nature of a firm’s ownership, which equals 
to one if the firm is a SOE, zero otherwise. 
Table 8 presents the results of Eq. (6) and shows that the coefficient estimates of the 
interaction term State*IRdereg*Trans is significantly negative, indicating that the favorable 
effects of earnings transparency on corporate debt financing is weakened when considering the 
corporate ownership effects. It implies that, in China, SOEs under the condition of deregulating 
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interest rate still have an advantage to acquire debt finances because of the existing natural 
benefits between SOEs and state-owned banks (Rao and Jiang, 2013). Such an advantage 
enables SOEs to have a better access to bank finance. 
Table 8. Corporate ownership, interest rate deregulation and debt financing 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Lev Lev Lev 
Constant -0.862*** -0.860*** -0.868*** 
 (-13.23) (-13.21) (-13.34) 
Trans -0.012 -0.008 0.021* 
 (-0.59) (-0.65) (1.70) 
IRdereg -0.090*** -0.087*** -0.082*** 
 (-9.87) (-12.66) (-11.05) 
State -0.017* -0.013* -0.007 
 (-1.69) (-1.68) (-0.75) 
State*Trans 0.036   
 (1.51)   
IRdereg*Trans 0.044   
 (1.58)   
State*IRdereg 0.067*** 0.052*** 0.061*** 
 (4.77) (5.47) (4.73) 
State*IRdereg*Trans -0.082*   
 (-1.82)   
State*Transi  0.054***  
  (2.64)  
IRdereg*Transi  0.099*  
  (1.72)  
State*IRdereg*Transi  -0.009  
  (-0.10)  
State*Transin   -0.021 
   (-0.88) 
IRdereg*Transin   0.009 
   (0.33) 
State*IRdereg* Transin   -0.063 
   (-1.18) 
Control variables Yes Yes Yes 
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 13533 13533 13533 
Adjusted R-squared 0.468 0.468 0.468 
 Note 1: The table presents regression coefficients and t-statistics (in parentheses) for Eq. (6), by using a cluster 
analysis at the firm level for all samples with full set of controls. The dependent variables are the total 
debt ratio. We exclude the year dummies because the variable IRdereg is measured as a year dummy 
variable.  
 Note 2: All VIFs are lower than 10. *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level for 
which the null hypothesis is rejected. Results for control variables are not reported but available upon 
request from the authors. 
 
5.4 The impact of economic growth target in each province of China 
Xu and Liang (2014) suggested that the government can promote regional economic 
development through strategic adjustment of economic growth targets. Further more，Xu and 
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Liu (2017) suggested that setting an economic growth target is a worldwide phenomenon 
ignored by current studies. Therefore, we use the economic growth target to test the impact of 
interest rate deregulation and earnings transparency on debt financing in different economic 
growth target in different province of China. 
Table 9. Economic growth target, interest rate deregulation and debt financing 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Lev Lev Lev 
Constant -1.046*** -1.058*** -1.079*** 
 (-12.42) (-14.37) (-14.62) 
Trans -0.071 -0.008 0.085*** 
 (-0.67) (-0.60) (5.63) 
IRdereg -0.079 -0.036 -0.066** 
 (-1.58) (-1.08) (-2.07) 
Target 0.006 0.007** 0.010*** 
 (1.22) (2.35) (3.02) 
Target*Trans 0.010   
 (0.94)   
IRdereg*Trans 0.108   
 (0.75)   
Target*IRdereg 0.000 -0.004 -0.001 
 (0.07) (-1.24) (-0.25) 
Target*IRdereg*Trans -0.007   
 (-0.45)   
Target*Transi  0.008***  
  (3.82)  
IRdereg*Transi  -0.475  
  (-1.57)  
Target*IRdereg*Transi  0.068**  
  (2.21)  
Target*Transin   -0.011*** 
   (-4.66) 
IRdereg*Transin   0.072 
   (0.73) 
Target*IRdereg* Transin   -0.002 
   (-0.16) 
Control variables Yes Yes Yes 
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 12727 12727 12727 
Adjusted R-squared 0.436 0.437 0.437 
Note 1: The table presents regression coefficients and t-statistics (in parentheses) for Eq. (7), by using a cluster 
analysis at the firm level for all samples with full set of controls. The dependent variables are the total 
debt ratio. We exclude the year dummies because the variable IRdereg is measured as a year dummy 
variable.  
 Note 2: All VIFs are lower than 10. *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level for 
which the null hypothesis is rejected. Results for control variables are not reported but available upon 
request from the authors. 
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Table 9 presents the results and shows that the coefficient estimates of the interaction term 
Target*IRdereg*Transi is significantly positive in column (2), indicating that the favorable 
effects of industry-specific earnings transparency on corporate debt financing is strengthened 
when considering the economic growth target in different province of China. It implies that 
economic growth target under the condition of deregulating interest rate the government's 
economic regulation is beneficial to the entire industry, not a single enterprise. That means 
government control is conducive to enhancing the transparency of the industry that is firm’s 
own, not firm’s own transparency. 
5.5 The impact of marketization index in each province of China 
To measure distortion，Zhang et al. (2018) used the Marketization Index which is published 
by the China National Economic Research Institute. They suggested that the Marketization 
Index have a positive effect on TFP in the early stages of development. As such, we use the 
Marketization Index to test the impact of interest rate deregulation and earnings transparency 
on debt financing in different marketization level in different province of China. 
Table 10 presents the results and shows that the coefficient estimates of the interaction term 
Marketization*IRdereg*Transin is significantly positive, indicating that the favorable effects 
of company-specific earnings transparency on corporate debt financing is strengthened when 
considering the marketization level in different province of China.  Specifically, this result  
shows  that marketization under the condition of deregulating interest rate still has an advantage 
to acquire debt financing because of the existing marketization reform dividend. As such,   
investors would find it worth to pay more attention to the company's own unique information 
transparency in the provinces with high degree of marketization. 
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Table 10. Marketization index, interest rate deregulation and debt financing 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Lev Lev Lev 
Constant -0.993*** -0.970*** -0.988*** 
 (-14.76) (-14.64) (-14.92) 
Trans 0.112** -0.000 0.094*** 
 (2.24) (-0.01) (6.36) 
IRdereg -0.016 -0.063*** -0.004 
 (-0.65) (-2.81) (-0.18) 
Marketization 0.002 -0.000 0.003 
 (0.96) (-0.16) (1.23) 
Marketization*Trans -0.011   
 (-1.62)   
IRdereg*Trans -0.071   
 (-0.79)   
Marketization*IRdereg -0.008** -0.002 -0.010*** 
 (-2.54) (-0.78) (-3.69) 
Marketization*IRdereg*Trans 0.015   
 (1.34)   
Marketization*Transi  0.009***  
  (3.46)  
IRdereg*Transi  0.621**  
  (2.17)  
Marketization*IRdereg*Transi  -0.057  
  (-1.60)  
Marketization*Transin   -0.016*** 
   (-5.19) 
IRdereg*Transin   -0.179** 
   (-2.14) 
Marketization*IRdereg* Transin   0.033*** 
   (3.03) 
Control variables Yes Yes Yes 
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 12749 12749 12749 
Adjusted R-squared 0.435 0.436 0.436 
Note 1: The table presents regression coefficients and t-statistics (in parentheses) for Eq. (7), by using a cluster 
analysis at the firm level for all samples with full set of controls. The dependent variables are the total 
debt ratio. We exclude the year dummies because the variable IRdereg is measured as a year dummy 
variable.  
 Note 2: All VIFs are lower than 10. *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level for 
which the null hypothesis is rejected. Results for control variables are not reported but available upon 
request from the authors. 
 
5.6 Endogeneity tests 
The robustness of above results could be also subjective to the endogeneity issue which may 
exist because of the reverse causality where firms have higher debt ratio might be more likely 
to be supervised by lenders, and then have higher information transparency. The second reason 
28 
 
of endogeneity is that better firms (e.g. corporate governance) have more debt ratio and higher 
information transparency. To address this issue, we use a variety of empirical models, such as 
fixed effect model, fixed effect model with instrument variables (IV), two-period factors 
regression method with IV and the instrumental variables used are earnings management index 
(Prawitt et al., 2009) and lagged Trans. Table 11 shows the results where endogeneity issue 
does not exist in the system and the effect of earnings transparency remains economically 
relevant and statistically significant at a 1% level.   
Table 11. Endogeneity tests  
 (1) (2) (3) 
 FE FE_IV 2SlS_IV 
Cons -0.460*** -0.493*** -1.015*** 
 (-10.37) (-9.53) (-13.66) 
Trans 0.018*** 0.013** 0.923*** 
 (2.93) (2.01) (3.08) 
Control variables Yes Yes Yes 
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 13793 11453 11453 
Adjusted R-squared 0.252  0.097 
Hausman(P value)  0.9996  
Over-identifying(P value)  0.0000  
 Note 1: The table presents regression coefficients and t-statistics for Endogeneity tests by using fixed effect 
model, fixed effect model with adding instrument variables, two-period factors regression method with 
adding instrument variables, system GMM with adding instrument variables (earnings management 
index and lag of earnings transparency). The dependent variables are the total debt ratio.  
 Note2: *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level for which the null hypothesis is 
rejected. Results for control variables are not reported but available upon request from the authors.  
 
5.7 Robustness tests 
5.7.1 Controlling for equity finance 
Based on the Barth at al. (2013), earnings transparency is negatively related to the costs of 
capital, including both the cost of debt and cost of equity finance. Therefore, it is also possible 
that earnings transparency reduces the cost of equity finance for sample Chinese firms. Our 
conjecture is that creditors, i.e. lenders, are more concerned with earnings transparency which 
signals the creditability of borrowers, and therefore cost of debt finance is more sensitive to the 
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improvement of earnings transparency than equity finance, thus leading an increase of leverage 
as shown earlier. To test such a conjecture, we control for the availability of equity finance by 
‘exceeded fund’ which is measured by the difference between the expected amount of equity a 
sample firm would like to raise when IPO and the actual amount they raised. By controlling 
for the availability of equity finance, our baseline results on the favorable effects of earnings 
transparency on leverage (H1) still hold, as shown in Table 12. Our results show that exceed 
funds a sample firm received from stock markets reduce their demand for debt finance and 
therefore, lead to a lower leverage.  
Table12. Earnings transparency and debt financing after controlling equity financing  
  (1) (2) (3) 
  Lev Lev Lev 
Constant -1.247*** -1.245*** -1.245*** 
 (-11.84) (-11.82) (-11.84) 
Trans 0.025*   
 (1.94)   
Transi  0.050**  
  (1.98)  
Transin   0.02  
   (1.35) 
Exceeded Fund -0.045*** -0.045*** -0.045*** 
 (-10.14) (-10.26) (-10.19) 
Control variables Yes  Yes 
Industry dummies Yes   Yes 
Observations 2661 2661 2661 
Adjusted R-squared 0.656 0.656 0.655 
 Note1: The table presents regression coefficients and t-statistics for test by using Earnings transparency and 
debt financing after controlling equity financing. The dependent variables are the total debt ratio.  
 Note 2: *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level for which the null hypothesis is 
rejected. Results for control variables are not reported but available upon request from the authors.  
 
5.7.2 Alternative proxy of interest rate deregulation 
In order to ensure the consistency of above results and to show the strength of the market-
oriented reform, we construct an alternative proxy for interest rate deregulation, IRdereg2, 
which is defined as the difference between market SHIBOR rates and controlled one-year base 
lending rate. Table 13 shows that the effect of earnings transparency remains economically 
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relevant and its statistical significance is also confirmed at a 1% level on total debt ratio, which 
is consistent with our earlier findings.  
 
Table 13. Alternative proxy of interest rate deregulation 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Lev Lev Lev 
Cons -1.089*** -1.076*** -1.077*** 
 (-16.19) (-16.05) (-16.01) 
IRdereg2 -0.036*** -0.031*** -0.034*** 
 (-15.69) (-16.60) (-14.50) 
Trans 0.146***   
 (8.39)   
IRdereg2*Trans 0.049***   
 (6.03)   
Transi  0.179***  
  (6.88)  
IRdereg2*Transi  0.053***  
  (5.55)  
Transin   0.184*** 
   (6.26) 
IRdereg2*Transin   0.070*** 
   (4.57) 
Control variables Yes Yes Yes 
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 12661 12661 12661 
Adjusted R-squared 0.463 0.463 0.463 
Note1: The table presents regression coefficients and t-statistics (in parentheses) for robustness tests of alternative 
proxy of interest rate control (IRdereg2) by using a cluster analysis at the firm level for all samples with 
full set of controls. IRdereg2 is calculated by the difference between market SHI 
 Note 2: All VIFs are lower than 10. *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level for 
which the null hypothesis is rejected. Results for control variables are not reported but available upon 
request from the authors. 
 
 
5.7.3 Alternative proxy of earnings transparency 
Additionally, we retest Eq. (5) by replacing the proxy of earnings transparency with R-Squared 
synchronicity indicator (Rsqi,t) (Table 11).  Rsqi,t is defined as log (𝑅𝑖,𝑡
2 (1 −⁄ 𝑅𝑖,𝑡
2 ), where 𝑅𝑖,𝑡
2  
is the fitting rate R2 of stock price synchronism index model (Morck et al.， 2000)2.The results 
                                                          
2  The systematic component of returns variation is large in emerging markets, and appears unrelated to 
fundamentals co-movement, consistent with noise trader risk. 
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show that our main inference still hold. Hence, the effect of earnings transparency on corporate 
debt finance is not subject to the way of transparency is calculated. 
Table 14. Alternative proxy of earnings transparency 
 (1) (2) 
 Lev Lev 
Constant -0.988*** -0.921*** 
 (-15.38) (-14.47) 
Rsq 0.017*** 0.032*** 
 (6.65) (10.62) 
IRdereg  -0.066*** 
  (-16.38) 
IRdereg*Rsq  0.023*** 
  (5.01) 
GDP growth 0.532*** 0.059** 
 (18.04) (2.15) 
Control variables Yes Yes 
Industry dummies Yes Yes 
Observations 13720 13720 
Adjusted R-squared 0.460 0.470 
 Note1: The table presents regression coefficients and t-statistics (in parentheses) for robustness tests of 
alternative proxy of earnings transparency (Rsq) by using a cluster analysis at the firm level for all 
samples with full set of controls. Additional control variable used is the GDP growth rate. The 
dependent variables are the total debt ratio.  
 Note 2: The multicollinearity is checked by VIFs that all are less than 10. The *, ** and *** denote statistical 
significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level for which the null hypothesis is rejected. Results for control 
variables are not reported but available upon request from the authors. 
 
5.7.4 Consider equity financing 
Our previous results suggest that earnings transparency has weak influence on equity financing 
in this section. To capture the impacts of interest rate deregulation on equity financing, we use 
equity financing ratio as dependent variables to measure the rates (the actual fund of equity 
financing/total assets) of sample firms. We apply a cluster analysis at firm level for all samples 
with a full set of control variables and report the results in Table 15. It shows that the effects 
of earnings transparency on the equity financing is weak positive. Therefore, our empirical 
results support the conjecture that earnings transparency improves leverage by reducing the 
cost of debt finance.  
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Table 15. Earnings transparency and the equity financing  
 
  (1) (2) (3) 
  
Equity financing 
ratio 
Equity financing ratio Equity financing ratio 
Constant 2.091*** 2.093*** 2.068*** 
 -10.49 -10.45 -10.53 
Trans 0.117*   
 (1.74)   
Transi  -0.076  
  (-0.91)  
Transin   0.303* 
   (2.77) 
Control variables Yes  Yes 
Industry dummies Yes  Yes 
Year dummies Yes   Yes 
Observations 1153 1153 1153 
Adjusted R-squared 0.304 0.302 0.331 
 Note1: The table presents regression coefficients and t-statistics (in parentheses) for tests of earnings transparency 
and the equity financing by using a cluster analysis at the firm level for all samples with full set of 
controls. The dependent variables are Equity financing ratio, which is calculated by the ratio of equity 
financing and asset.  
Note 2: All VIFs are lower than 10. *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level for 
which the null hypothesis is rejected. Results for control variables are not reported but available upon 
request from the authors. 
 
We explicitly consider the impacts of interest rate deregulation by IRdereg and its interaction 
terms with earnings transparency measures.  Similar to earlier results, the coefficients of 
interaction terms, are positive and not significantly, which means interest rate deregulation and 
earnings transparency has no effect on equity financing. 
Table 16. Earnings transparency, interest rate deregulation and equity financing 
  (1) (2) (3) 
  Equity financing ratio Equity financing ratio 
Equity financing 
ratio 
Constant 2.030*** 2.027*** 2.020*** 
 (10.09) (10.06) (10.07) 
Irdereg 0.039 0.060*** 0.043* 
 (1.56) (2.67) (1.84) 
Trans 0.102*   
 (1.78)   
Transi  0.006  
  (0.06)  
Transin   0.218*** 
   (2.63) 
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IRdereg*Trans 0.107   
 (0.75)   
IRdereg*Transi  -0.241  
  (-1.06)  
IRdereg*Transin   0.155 
   (0.79) 
Control variables Yes  Yes 
Industry dummies Yes   Yes 
Observations 1153 1153 1153 
Adjusted R-squared 0.287 0.283 0.294 
 Note 1: The table presents regression coefficients and t-statistics (in parentheses) for tests of earnings 
transparency, interest rate deregulation and the equity financing by using a cluster analysis at the firm 
level for all samples with full set of controls. The dependent variables are Equity financing ratio, which 
is calculated by the ratio of equity financing and asset.  
 Note 2: All VIFs are lower than 10. *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level for 
which the null hypothesis is rejected. Results for control variables are not reported but available upon 
request from the authors. 
 
5.7.5 Using GLS and system GMM 
In order to make our results more robust, we test the results with general least squares. Table 
17 shows the results that the effect of total earnings transparency, earnings transparency of 
industry and firms’ own earnings transparency remain economically relevant and statistically 
significant at a 1% significance level. The results are basically consistent with the results on 
the basis of ordinary least square method 
Table 17. Using General Least Squares  
 (1) (2) (3) 
 GLS GLS GLS 
Cons -1.015*** -1.043*** -1.383** 
 (-13.66) (-11.05) (-3.11) 
Trans 0.035***   
 (5.99)   
Transi  0.060***  
  (4.11)  
Transin   0.037*** 
   (4.59) 
Control variables Yes Yes Yes 
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 2582 25823 2582 
 Note 1: The table presents regression coefficients and t-statistics for Endogeneity tests by using fixed effect 
model, fixed effect model with adding instrument variables, two-period factors regression method with 
adding instrument variables, system GMM with adding instrument variables (earnings management 
index and lag of earnings transparency). The dependent variables are the total debt ratio.  
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 Note2: *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level for which the null hypothesis is 
rejected. Results for control variables are not reported but available upon request from the authors. 
 
In order to make our results more robust, we test the results with system GMM. Table 18 shows 
the results that the effect of total earnings transparency and firms’ own earnings transparency 
remain economically relevant and statistically significant at a 10% significance level. The 
results are basically consistent with the results on the basis of ordinary least square method 
Table 18. Using system GMM  
 (1) (2) (3) 
 System GMM System GMM System GMM 
Cons -1.015*** -1.043*** -1.383** 
 (-13.66) (-11.05) (-3.11) 
Trans 0.0459*   
 (2.53)   
Transi  0.0353  
  (1.56)  
Transin   0.0510* 
   (1.97) 
Levt-1 0.451*** 0.433*** 0.452*** 
 (4.31) (4.24) (4.33) 
Control variables Yes Yes Yes 
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 1620 1620 1620 
Hausman(P value) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Over-identifying(P value) 0.8780 0.8986 0.8986 
 Note 1: The table presents regression coefficients and t-statistics for Endogeneity tests by using fixed effect 
model, fixed effect model with adding instrument variables, two-period factors regression method with 
adding instrument variables, system GMM with adding instrument variables (earnings management 
index and lag of earnings transparency). The dependent variables are the total debt ratio.  
 Note2: *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level for which the null hypothesis is 
rejected. Results for control variables are not reported but available upon request from the authors. 
 
6. Conclusion and Implication  
This paper investigates the relationship between information transparency and debt financing 
behavior of Chinese listed firm.  Our results are consistent with those reported in existing 
literature, such as Francis et al. (2004) and Zhang and Lu (2007), and suggest that 
informationally transparent firms have a higher debt ratio and lower effective interest costs on 
bank loans. In addition, this paper further explores the role played by interest rate deregulation 
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in corporate finance, and in turn market fund allocation. We find that deregulation of interest 
rates allows firms to have a worse access to debt finance, and information transparency would 
moderate such an effect on corporate capital structure. This result supports the contemporary 
view on ‘supply-side’ effect and highlights the significant effects of new information in the 
hands of lenders on their ability to select better clients (De Janvry et al., 2010). Our results are 
robust to alternative proxies of key variables as well as additional controls of earnings quality, 
corporate credit risks. In addition, we shed new light on the interactions between earnings 
transparency and interest rate deregulation in the context of state owned firm, different 
economic growth target and different marketization level in each province of China. 
Firstly, we examine the effects of state ownership, on corporate leverage in a setting of 
interest rate deregulation and find that SOEs have an advantage over private firms in accessing 
debt finance with interest rate deregulation. Secondly, we suggest that economic growth target 
is conducive to enhancing the transparency of the industry, but not the firm’s own transparency. 
Secondly, we suggest that economic growth target is conducive to enhancing the transparency 
of the industry, but not the  f\irm’s own transparency. Fourthly, we suggest that marketization 
in each province of China is conducive to enhancing firm’s own transparency, but not the 
transparency of the industry. 
It implies that state banks, SOEs and local governments are still the biggest players on both 
the demand and supply sides of the Chinese credit markets. However, it might take time for the 
new scheme to function properly, because banks, depositors, market participants and regulators 
all need to gain experience and adapt to the new regime. Therefore, the importance of this paper 
lies in the fact that first, it provides additional evidence on the effect of market-oriented reforms 
through how the information transparency interacts with the financial decisions making of 
corporations. Second, it offers policy implication to banking market deregulation in China.  
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Our findings give rise to a number of important implications. First, we contribute to the 
literature on both the relation between financial disclosures and corporate financing (e.g. Barth 
et al., 2013) and the interaction between macroeconomic policies and micro-enterprise 
behaviors (e.g. Rao and Jiang, 2013). Second, a critical challenge to any economy is the 
allocation of limited resources to efficient investment opportunities. This paper provides 
evidence that SOEs have competitive advantages in accessing external finance against private 
and small businesses in China. This would be the target of banking market reform in order to 
bring a fair financing environment for all businesses in China. Third, our conclusion can 
suggest how the action of interest rate deregulation effect on financing cost and liquidity 
management, which is the supplementary conclusion based on the Campello et al. (2011). 
With respect to further work, we aim to investigate how the earnings transparency has impact 
on the debt financing; and how such impact would depend on the openness of specific business, 
the cap of foreign shareholding and the convenience of investment in 2019. We also focus on  
the financing difficulties of SMEs.  Doing so, would allow us to find a solution to the financing 
difficulties of SMEs in emerging economies which are similar to China. 
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